

Vol.1: Spring 2016



Organizing A_NA_RC_HY

The Role of International Organizations in the World



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Letter from the Editor

It is our great pleasure to present to you the inaugural issue of the Kaplan Journal of Foreign Affairs. We started the journal with one clear objective in mind: to give you, our readers and fellow students, an opportunity to engage with global events beyond the classroom. It is our hope that this journal would provide you with a venue to explore international affairs, ask questions, and challenge the ways we engage with the world around us.

With these goals in mind, we launch our inaugural issue with the theme of "International Organizations." Institutions like the UN, NATO, and Interpol shape our world, and this issue investigates their interactions with communities and nations. In the aftermath of Paris and other terrorist attacks, we consider emerging threats to national security, including from cyberspace. The issue includes pieces on topics beyond the headlines, such as the Burundi Crisis and the continual struggle against poverty in Brazil and Latin America, as well as well-debated issues like China's role in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, we examine our own political system in the United States—and with that, the issue offers a perspective on Trump's foreign policy.

Our pieces are intended to appeal to a broad spectrum of readers, from those who have never taken a course in international relations or picked up an issue of Foreign Affairs, to those who, like our staff editor David Han, aspire to enter the Foreign Service. The journal would not exist without the support of Carrie Greene, Professor James McAllister, and the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy, as well as our dedicated writers and editors, to whom we give our greatest thanks.

We have truly enjoyed putting together this issue for you and hope you enjoy it.

Sincerely, Katie Shao, Editor-in-Chief Gregory Steinhelper and Henry Lu, Managing Editors

> Cover Design by Emma Robinson Globe Pic: NASA

U.S. Defense Acquisitions for the Future

Why the military needs to increase investments in counterinsurgency and cyberspace

Henry Lu

ood militaries should avoid fighting the last war. When it comes to defense acquisitions and war planning, U.S. generals are particularly interested in promoting technological innovation and anticipating future threats in order to prepare the capabilities needed to fight future conflicts. Today, America's foreseeable threats involve counterinsurgency operations and cyberwarfare. This reality requires a shift in investment to counterinsurgency and cyber capabilities.

The U.S. Department of Defense has significantly increased investments in cyberwarfare, and energized its focus on counterinsurgency capabilities after the outbreak of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, the broader strategy of modern U.S. defense acquisitions still aims to attain the kind of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities envisioned in the 1990s. Back then, the U.S. goal was to keep ahead of its greatest rival, which, after the Cold War, was widely regarded as China. The U.S. military therefore developed systems to provide assured access to coastal battlespaces, investing in integrating ships, aircraft, and army personnel. The aim of this integration was

to create a Cooperative Engagement Capability providing an information advantage by allowing each unit to contribute to a Common Operational Picture, as well as an operational advantage by helping the military overwhelm enemy defenses with swarming tactics, self-synchronized units, and efficient, concentrated fire.

The turn of the millennium brought two important changes to the U.S. military threat landscape: the dramatic rise in the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil and the emergence of the cyberworld as a military arena. After 9/11, the United States found itself in pro-

tracted counterinsurgency campaigns with inadequate tools, creating domestic pressure to develop new technologies like the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle. The demand for counter-insurgency equipment will not go away anytime soon—the United States had hardly weakened Al-Qaeda before ISIS emerged. The advent of the Information Age brought a further change to the military future by creating a new battleground in cyberspace. The U.S. military responded by establishing Cyber Command in 2009 and exponentially increasing its budget for cyber operations. Like the requirement for counter-insurgency capabilities, cyber needs are here to stay. The threat of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure is the new reality, while the cyber role in terrorist financing and recruitment is mounting as shown by groups like ISIS.

Despite growing threats from non-state actors and new requirements in the information age, U.S. defense investments are still largely focused on acquiring NCW capabilities for dealing with great power rivals. The U.S. military recently announced its "Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)," a

Cybersecurity is a rapidly growing industry around the world.



re-naming of its previous "AirSea Battle Doctrine," which aimed to overcome the A2AD capabilities of countries like China. JAM-GC is worsening a security dilemma with China, resulting in an arms race as China energizes its A2AD defenses. Yet the probability that America's expensive NWC capabilities would be used in a conflict with China is slim. An American invasion of Chinese coasts could trigger an all-out war, quickly escalating to a nuclear conflict. Given the enormous costs of such a move, it is unlikely that the United States would throw its JAM-GC capabilities into Chinese waters without a massive provocation, which China in turn would avoid creating.

On the other hand, cyber disagreements are on-going between the United States and China, as well as a whole host of other countries around the world. Espionage and the potential of cyberattacks will remain in the threat environment of the foreseeable future. U.S. critical



Network-Centric warfare aims for closer co-ordination of land, sea, and air forces.

which requires investment not only in bombs and bullets, but also in innovation to "win hearts and minds." This in novation requires investments in better intelligence, training missions, and in the case of weapons, weapons with targeting technology and yields designed to mini-

mize civilian casualties. NCW cost hundreds of billions of dollars for aircraft carriers, stealth jets, and communications systems. One might imagine the impact hundreds of billions of dollars could make

on filling gaps in counter-insurgency and cybersecurity.

In the past, preparing to fight the next war meant ac-

quiring better weapons-rifles, machine guns, aircraft, missiles, then nuclear bombs. The metrics for innovation were physical measures like speed, stealth, and strength. Today, defining innovation is a greater challenge, because the realms of cyberspace and civilian hearts and minds are intangible, unlike ships and aircraft. Yet if the U.S. military intends to prepare to fight the next war, the nebulous arenas of cyberspace and counterinsurgency will become areas of major importance, not the least because these types of conflicts have already begun.

The turn of the millennium brought two important changes to the U.S. military threat landscape: the dramatic rise in the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil and the emergence of the cyberworld as a military arena.

infrastructure is not fully secure from cyberattacks, but the resources for creating defenses are limited. Similarly, the U.S. budget has limited funds for counterinsurgency,

Cybersecurity has become a matter of national security in the face of mounting threats of espionage and attacks on critical infrastructure.



Recycling Isolationism and Imperialism Again

Donald J. Trump and the Foreign Policy Ideology of Rogue Toughness

Jack Greenberg

ven on matters in which his business career would have lent him some expertise, Donald J. Trump has sat on the receiving end of a multitude of critiques that the businessman and reality television star has formulated no consistent, much less substantive, policy proposals in his campaign for the presidency. His tax plan is largely a regurgitation of typical Republican fiscal objectives like eliminating the "death tax" and reducing marginal rates for all while underestimated the actual cost of his "border wall," excluding maintenance expenses, by about \$17,000,000,000. With expertise like this, what qualifies as superficial knowledge? This weakness on economic policy makes an examination of Trump's foreign policy platform all the more intriguing,

especially in light of how Oval Office aspirants lacking in federal government experience, ranging from Mitt Romney to Dr. Ben Carson, have historically struggled to display their competence in handling these complex and sensitive issues. In her since suspended campaign to serve as Commander-in-Chief this election cycle, Carly Fiorina, the former Chief Executive Officer of Hewlett-Packard, deflected charges that she was unqualified to handle the nation's foreign policy by citing her international business experience and past associates with prominent world leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump, by comparison, has taken a different approach but one that comfortably finds its antecedents in the American foreign policy tradition. The pageant owner turned likely

Trump regrets how the world has tasked America with ensuring global stability.



Republican nominee advocates for the United States defining its relationship with the rest of the world in overt masculine terms that signals how the solution to all of America's problems rests merely in "getting tough."

With economic inequality at historic highs, terrorist

these crucial matters, asserting how he only consults "myself" on foreign policy while displaying clear ignorance on topics like the nuclear triad and imposition of sanctions on Russia. He demagogically riles up his massive crowds with outright falsities, such as when he as-

The frontrunner wants the United States to define its relationship with the rest of the world in overt masculine terms that signal how the solution to all of America's problems rests merely in "getting tough."


attacks both home and abroad and the nation as polarized as ever, the nation faces sincere threats to its prosperity. The common denominator to these issues, according to Trump, is that "we do not win anymore." As Ezra Klein of Vox notes, Trump maintains an aggressively zero-sum understanding of how the world operates. Any other country's economic or geopolitical advancement is inherently a loss for the United States. The prominence that the United States once had has disappeared thanks to the sloppy work of our leaders and negotiators, Trump claims. He applauded one of his supporters referring to Sen. Ted Cruz, his biggest threat to securing the Republican nomination, as a "pussy" and titled one of his recent books Time to Get Tough: Make America Great Again!. He has labelled the country "very weak and ineffective" while glorifying the masculinity of the nation's adversaries, referring to Putin as a "strong" leader who would pair nicely with the Trump Organization head in what the Washington Post labelled a potentially endearing "bromance." What is notable about this rhetoric is that, though aggressively mascu-

line, it is not paternalistic. Trump maintains a sincere disgust with the international order as it is currently structured. The front runner talks of redesigning the bilateral relationships the United States shares with its allies and wants America to critically re-examine, and ultimately pull back from, its involvement in multinational organizations like NATO and the United Nations. He regrets how the world has tasked America was ensuring global stability and is looking to rebel.

In spite of advancing these bold ideas, however, he appears out of depth when discussing serts that the United States gave \$150 billion to Iran as part of the 2015 nuclear deal; in actuality, America was only unfreezing Iranian assets as part of the package and, moreover, Iran still cannot buy U.S. industrial goods. Outright factual inaccuracy aside, what is perhaps most disconcertingly ignorant about Trump's rhetoric on foreign policy rests in the sincere paucity of nuance displayed in any of his views on America's relationship with the rest of the world. The communications director of Trump's super pac (named Make America Great Again Super Pac, natch) resigned following a tweet from Trump after the Taliban bombings of Pakistan on Easter saying "I alone can solve" this problem, his one-time staffer deriding the Republican frontrunner for "childish arrogance." Trump has shown a strong tendency to speak in this manner, claiming that he will, in effect, get big stuff done like "totally dismantl[ing] Iran's global terror network" or "rebuild[ing] our military and mak[ing] it strong" while skimping on the details. Of course, when the Donald is confronted about this lack of specificity, to put it politely, the Wrestlemania guest star

Trump's campaign slogan: "Make America Great Again."





The underlying reality is that Trump has no wellspring of foreign policy insight or training to offer.

informs his inquisitors that he is one step ahead of them: "[1] wouldn't want [other countries and allies] to know what my real thinking is." However strong the prospect of Donald Trump performing a Jedi mind trick from behind the Resolute desk may prove, the underlying reality is that Trump has no wellspring of foreign policy insight or training to offer, like many presidential contenders before him, and has opted to account for this dearth of expertise with overtly masculine displays of confidence and masterfully reductive reasoning, unlike the lion's share of contemporary aspiring commanders-in-chief.

However, even if Trump's "foreign policy" is little more than an amalgamation of nonsensical boasts of American might and capacity, the one appellation it ought not merit is "new." Despite the claims from his acolytes that the Donald is "refreshing" and a break from "politics as usual," Trump is merely repackaging antiquated notions of economic imperialism and military isolationism for the 21st century while disregarding the layers of discordance that have emerged since these ideologies grew outmoded. In

He accounts for a lack of expertise with overtly masculine displays of confidence and masterfully reductive reasoning



Irresistible Empire, Victoria de Grazia writes on how the post-World War II global political climate enabled America's entrenched commercial interests to treat a devastated Europe propped up by the Marshall Plan as an extension of the U.S. domestic market, importing the American conceptualization of consumership as citizenship along the way. A significant power imbalance - indeed, a dependence - allowed for the United States to "win" in a manner that Trump laments is no longer achievable. World War II, in addition, sang the death dirge of the notion that the United States could function as an isolationist power while also fulfilling its global objectives, political, economic and otherwise. A prominent exception to this trend is Sen. Robert Taft who, like Trump, pursued the Republican nomination for the presidency. Throughout his career and fights for the nomination in 1940, 19448 and 1952, Taft's mercantilist sensibilities and "America First" attitude inspired his staunch opposition to free trade and disavowal of multinational organizations. However, America had come to serve, for better or worse, as a bedrock of global

stability and a guarantor of opportunities for free enterprise across the world. In effect, Taft's thinking was disconnected from the world that rested on the horizon and he could never find his way to serving as the standard bearer of his party. Yet, in the years since, America has met that horizon and one of its two major parties is more than likely about to name a resurrected Taft its nominee. The unquestionable underwent an interrogation and "the silent majority," as Trump identifies his supporters, enabled a revisitation of a foreign policy ideology that proves nonsensical and deeply problematic in a modern context, especially when championed by an erstwhile reality television star with a penchant for mendacity and demagoguery.

Brazil: Zika, Rio, Rousseff—and Poverty?

Why, despite all the problems Brazil is facing right now, poverty remains the *real* issue.

Katie Shao

t this moment, Brazil is caught in a tough balancing act. A recent outbreak of Dengue fever last year has left almost 1.6 million infected. The Zika virus, although mostly found in the northern areas of Brazil—where rural communities lacking proper medical support have been hit hardest—has nevertheless begun its spread to the more wealthy, urban southeast. In October 2015 alone, a northeastern state of Brazil (Bahia) reported 56,318 cases of suspected Zika.

Riding on the shoulders of these epidemics is the threat of an unsuccessful summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. The games, which was given to Brazil in 2009 in addition to the 2014 World Cup, and viewed as the crowning jewel to Brazil's 21st-century rise to a global power, has been increasingly a source of friction and discontent for its citizens at home. Construction for the nearly complete stadium has stretched the pockets of the city. At the end of 2015, less than 50% of the almost 5 million domestic tickets have been sold, a New York Times article reported. Add in the political turmoil that the nation is currently facing with President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment trials, the global oil crisis, and

Brazil fighting the Zika virus.



the Worker's Party (PT) still reeling from outcry against it that has come from the unveiling of the Petrobras corruption scandal, creating deep political fissures in the nation in addition to straining its already weakened economy—and you've got a country juggling too many torches.

Brazil should heed these issues right now, of course—but not simply to ward off short-term political turmoil or economic distress—rather, it should do so to look down the road at the effects they will have on one long-term problem: poverty. Out of these issues, poverty is the one that will have the most impact on Brazil's continual rise in the global stage.

Why it matters: Latin America today remains the region in the world with the highest income inequality, with 14 out of the 15 countries in the world that are ranked globally as the most impoverished. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that by the end of 2016, the number of those living in poverty—defined as just below US\$4/day—will increase roughly by 1.5 million, adding to the 1.7 million that grew in 2014.

In recent years, due to a series of anti-poverty initiatives led by their national leaders, Colombia, Argentina, and

Brazil have taken great strides to combat poverty within their borders. Programs such as the Familias en Acción (Families in Action) initiative of Colombia, and Asignación Universal por Hijo (Universal Child Allowance), instituted in Argentina in 2009, have been regarded as highly successful, and several programs have even become models for other countries to replicate.

One such case of particular success is Brazil's Bolsa Familía, an initiative that President Lula launched in October of 2003 as part of a nationwide social welfare program called DzFome Zerodz (Zero Hunger). The program gives cash handouts to

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Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff during a ceremony against impeachment at the Presidential Palace, March 31st, 2016.

below the poverty line, with only 0.4% identified as living in extreme poverty, or below US\$1.90/day, and 1.7% at around US\$3.10/day. Chile ranks second, with its population at 1.3% and almost 3%, respectively, and Argentina follows at 1.6% and 3.7%. Yet Brazil, the global giant and indisputably the largest economy of the region (accounting for almost 30% of Latin America's total GDP), places at 11 out of 18, with 4.6% in extreme poverty and 9.3% at just above US\$3.10/day. In total, Brazil had 21.4% of its population living below the poverty line in 2014—and al-

qualifying families with children, but links aid to the condition that children maintain a

Latin America today remains the region in the world with the highest income inequality, with 14 out of the 15 countries in the world that are ranked globally as the most impoverished.

minimum 80% primary school attendance, that the mother and children visit the doctor regularly for health checkups, or require vaccinations, and the like. These programs, called DzConditional Cash Transfersdz (CCTs), operate on the philosophy that those who need the money know best how to use it—and studies over the past few years have suggested that such a method of providing cash directly to households have been highly successful. Beyond that, the program costs the state nearly nothing. The average bene-

fit dished out is only US\$65 per family, and the maximum caps at US\$200. All this has allowed Brazil to reach over 50 million Brazilians to date with the program, and garnering immense public support all the while.

So if Brazil has a program that's working so well, why should we still worry about poverty? For one, Brazil, along with its neighbor Argentina, still ranks in the top in the region in terms the number of people who are in extreme poverty. Currently, with the global poverty line drawn at US\$4/day, Uruguay leads its Latin American neighbors in the lowest national population living

though the rate has been stabilizing in recent years, even going through periods of decline during Rousseff's first term, the problem of poverty is still far from over. Breaking the cycle and creating upward mobility is a long-term issue, and so far, though programs like Bolsa have made progress, they are short-term solutions compared to the structural changes that still remains to be done.

Secondly, Brazil's current headliners should remind us that the people disproportionately affected by national

Maria Nilza, 36, and mother of four, shows her "Bolsa Familia" social plan card in Serra Azul, Brazil.





A "slum" in Brazil, termed for the majority of its residents living at or below the poverty line

political turmoil, a corruption scandal, and a sluggish economy is the poor. President Rousseffand the PT might be bearing the brunt of the political backlash at the moment, but when the dust settles, and a new national agenda occupies the stage, what will be left of the progress of the Lula years?

The fact of the matter is, poverty is one of the issues most vulnerable to shocks in the global environment. Anything from natural disasters to dips and drops in the market can, and do, affect those living on the margins of the state. Particularly in Brazil, where the economy is so closely tied to agriculture, trade, and energy, any shift in climate, the price of oil, or international stability can pose formidable challenges to efforts at eradicating poverty. What remains now for us is not only to seek remedies for Brazil's current maladies—but also to look to, and anticipate, the implications that these problems might generate for the future.

China and the Paris Agreement

Largest polluter in the world promises strong support of new climate change agreement

Rebecca Van Pamel

hina took solid action towards reducing climate change this month at the second G20 Sherpa meeting of 2016. The Associated Press reports that China took the lead at the April meeting of many representatives of key members of the G20, asserting its strong support of the contents of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the most recent international climate change initiative.

The Paris Agreement, which goes up for signature by United Nations members on Earth day, April 22, 2016, hinges heavily on the support of nations with high rates of carbon emissions, like China and the United States. China's declaration of support represents a considerable step forward in the implementation of the Agreement, which, while technically adopted by 195 countries last fall, requires strong dedication from all of its participants in order to make a real difference in the

rising rates of climate change that the world is facing.

As a project of the UNFCCC (or United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), this agreement has a lot of work to do to repair the damage done by previous, less successful agreements. The 1992 Kyoto Protocol, a controversial agreement which divided the responsibilities of signatory nations by their level of economic prosperity, achieved little success because it failed to garner the full support of many key nations, including China and the United States. The Paris Agreement differs from the Kyoto Protocol in two promising ways: it has much stronger support than the Kyoto Protocol, and its stipulations are legally binding. This is the first agreement of its kind to provide legally binding targets for its signatories, and the UN hopes that this will keep participating nations more directly accountable for ensuring the success of its efforts.

The April Sherpa meeting is not the first time in more recent years that China has taken a stand in support of global initiatives to combat climate change. In a similar meeting in January, State Councilor H.E. Yang Jiechi made extended remarks on China's sincere interest in maintaining unified enthusiasm for the G20's cause of global cooperation, emphasizing that "without strong determination, nothing can be accomplished."

China certainly has a vested interest in implementing environmentally friendly reforms as soon as possible, as it has recently suffered greatly from the frequent outbreak of smog clouds in its industrial centers. The New York Times reports that the pollution in China has reached such dangerous levels that it may contribute to as many as 1.6 million deaths per year in the country, representing

a truly dire public health risk. China has no choice but to take steps to combat environmental dangers like this if it hopes to keep its people safe, or at the very least keep its industry sustainable.

In a document reporting its intended nationally determined contributions (or INDC) for the Paris Agreement, China noted not only its desire to mitigate the effects of climate change on its own people, but also its high level of responsibility for current climate change woes as

one of the most industrialized nations in the world. The INDC states that, "China is among one of those countries that are most severely affected by the adverse impacts of climate changes," and goes on to detail China's goals for actively mitigating its pollution levels and alleviating climate change. According to the document, China intends to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40% before the year 2020, and drastically increase the proportion of forested area within the country.

These goals, along with China's recent affirmation of the contents of the Paris Agreement, spell good news for future climate change mitigation efforts, as the Paris Agreement begins to take effect after Earth Day of this year. Time will tell whether recent forecasts of a potential economic downturn in China will impact its

China certainly has a vested interest in implementing environmentally friendly reforms as soon as possible, as it has recently suffered greatly from the frequent outbreak of smog clouds in its industrial centers.

ability to make good on its promises to make expensive eco-friendly changes to its industries. For now, the United Nations is optimistic that China's leadership at the April Sherpa meeting has set the stage for strong future initiative in curbing global climate change.

Zhang Gaoli signing Paris Agreement at UN headquarters April 22, 2016.



Identity Crisis

To bring NATO into the 21st century, the U.S. must learn from Ukraine and Brussels

Theme: International Organizations

Sarah Weiser

he website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lists two mission statements, one political and one military. The political mission statement lauds NATO's promotion of "democratic values," the military refers to "resolution of disputes." On its face, these two mission statements represent the ideal of U.S. global leadership. The US wants, after all, to make the world both safer and more democratic. If we look closer, however, we find that the two mission statements have caused an identity crisis within the organization and within the U.S.'s outlook on global security. As the nature of warfare evolves, this contradiction renders NATO more and more ineffective in addressing contemporary security threats.

There's no denying that NATO has effectively served US interests in the past. The alliance was critical in transforming Europe from a mass of warring states into a liberal order with intermingled economic, political, and security interests. Collective defense allowed the US to expand its sphere of influence into Western Europe and equipped this conglomerate to act as a unit in deterring Soviet interference and expansion. NATO's genius was its ability to pro-

tect even the smallest states from coercion by superpowers, and the key to creating this balance of power was NATO members' commitment to collective defense.

The US government clearly tailored NATO to the immediate reality of the Cold War; why, then, does the organization still exist twenty-five years after the breakup of the Soviet Union? Today's geopolitics and security threats bear little resemblance to those of the Cold War, when wars still involved armies fighting over territory. The world is no longer divided into warring blocs, and today's wars are far more compli-

cated than just the collision of two armies. International security threats have not disappeared, but they have clearly changed in such a way that requires the US to question NATO's mission. Global terrorism is the new warfare. NATO has potential to engage this new reality in a meaningful way, but it has a long way to go before it can do so.

NATO as it exists today is actually a liability for US security. Its wanton expansion after the Cold War has, arguably, created a geopolitical crisis of the US's own making. The clearest evidence of this crisis is our souring relationship with Russia. The existence of an alliance network, after all, implies that there is an enemy; for an alliance network that once opposed the Soviet Union to expand into its former sphere of influence signals to Russians that the West still treats them as a potential threat. Russia interprets NATO expansion as a metastatic growth of an organization that should have disbanded with the end of the Cold War, and as NATO inches closer to its borders, most notably in the former-Soviet Baltic states and potentially in states like Ukraine and Georgia, Russia is more likely to lash out. Americans may accuse the Russians of being

A map of NATO member nations.



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paranoid, but should not be surprised that the encroachment of an historic enemy into Russia's sphere of influence compromises a stable relationship between our nations.

The cause of this crisis is a fundamental contradiction within NATO's mission statement and, more broadly, in US foreign policy. The US has attempted to make NATO not only a strategic alliance, but also a kind of club for states that share American values. This campaign is attractive on paper; after all, the US wants to reward states with liberal governments and commendable human rights records. In practice, however, NATO's ideals and strategic purposes inevitably conflict. States like the Baltics,

Georgia, and Ukraine, after all, are models of liberal government and represent everything that the US should want to reward. They should also not be a part of NATO.

The US must be able to deny prospective members from joining NATO because NATO was created to serve



Police lining up around Euromaidan protests in Ukraine.

else risk its entire system of diplomacy; mutual security, after all, depends on a credible commitment to common defense. The US cannot make alliances that it is unwilling to actively defend. If the US lacks the will to defend states like Georgia and Ukraine, which it almost certainly do, it cannot commit itself to their defense. These states also

pose enormous moral hazard risks. Guaranteeing military aid to these countries would allow them to act more

recklessly against their Russian neighbors at the expense of other NATO members. NATO is meant to provide mutual security, and therefore must not include states, however liberal, that compromise this security. The US must resist the temptation to keep expanding its global influ-

ence through NATO because an alliance network stretched too thin will, at best, lose its strategic value and, at worst, drag the US and Europe into war. Expansion for its own sake makes perfect sense in the simple math of conventional warfare – more members means more guns, more guns means more victories. But the security environment has

Some argue that NATO should be scrapped entirely. The Cold War, they argue, is over long over and the organization represents the power politics of a bygone era. While it is true that NATO faces

changed, and so must NATO.

NATO can and should become a robust organization that reflects the current geopolitical reality.

the strategic interests of the United States, not to pat liberal governments on the back. The US must bring NATO to heel and return it to its original purpose. America's strategic interests currently do not involve expansion; on the contrary, expansion to these states is not strategic at all. If Russia attacks a NATO member, the US must respond or

Memorial to those killed in the March 22 terrorist attack on Brussels.



an identity crisis, it can still serve its purpose in today's world. It can and should become a robust organization that reflects the current geopolitical reality. The US and the world still need international bodies to coordinate our security, especially in an era of global terrorism. Europe's principle threat is no longer a neighboring superpower; there is actually no nation against which NATO must create a balance of power. The real challenge of security today is to coordinate security in a world as mobile and interconnected as ours. Expanding NATO to include countries like Ukraine does not necessarily aid us in this effort; on the contrary, it clings to an old geopolitical outlook and potentially creates new enemies. It is time to reframe NATO's mission to better fit today's needs, not to give up on collective defense entirely.

Today's geopolitics have overshadowed NATO, but the US can rework the organization into a model of coordination against terrorism. The recent attacks in Brussels have made painfully clear the need for coordinated security. The Turkish government admitted to having deported one of the suicide bombers, but clearly a coordinated anti-terrorism effort did not exist between Turkey and Belgium that could have connected the dots in time to prevent the attacks. To prevent future tragedies, the US and its allies will require thorough interconnection and interoperability of their defense and security capabilities. The challenge in coming years will thus be for NATO to adapt

its system of collective defense to terrorist attacks. The procedure surrounding Article 5, which mobilizes the organization in defense of an attacked member, must adapt to respond to more relevant acts of war, such as the terrorist attacks in Belgium. NATO's current footing makes it relevant only to conventional warfare. The world needs an up-to-date model for collective security. The US must also consider the strategic advantages of alliances with countries with less than stellar human rights records, like Turkey, rather than restrict collective defense only to the like-minded. NATO expansion is not dangerous provided it expands to include countries with strategic value.

NATO is a relic of a different world, and it was designed to answer to that world's threats. Today, however, Americans can no longer leave their security up to an organization with contradictory missions. It may leave a bad taste in Americans' mouths to exclude from NATO countries that represent everything in which the US believes, from liberal democracy to the protection of human rights, but the best contribution the US can make to these governments is to foster a lasting peace in which these values and institutions will be able to flourish. NATO was created as, and should remain, a strategic alliance. The world will continue to face international crises and threats of terrorism, and US would be best equipped to have a relevant and adaptive organization overseeing its collective security against these threats.

Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of a meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry.



Abusing Interpol

International Organizations as Avenues of Both Cooperation and Exploitation

Theme: International Organizations

Gregory Steinhelper

he exploitation of international organizations to further national interests is nothing new, L but this dynamic takes on more meaning and poignancy when the organization in question is Interpol, and the exploitation centers on justice and rule of law. While Interpol is simply a cooperative network that helps police forces in member states access information that will help in making arrests, it is neither weak nor useless. According to one study conducted by US scholars led by Todd Sandler at UT Dallas, dollars put toward Interpol yield a significant "profit" when it comes to the conduct of counterterrorism, and, as they note, Interpol rarely entails the political backlash and other negative outcomes associated with military intervention. Clearly, with this type of research, choices can be made to skew the data and come out with positive numbers, but nonetheless, it seems clear that Interpol serves a useful role in the international system. But abuse of Interpol's cooperative network can also lead to negative outcomes, namely the harassment, detention, and overall persecution of political opponents of regimes. Reform can and will improve the situation, but the global community must recognize

Members of Interpol in blue, non-members in grey. Clearly, one of Interpol's strengths is its wide reach.



the limitations of international organizations as well.

Interpol's cooperative network is based on National Central Bureaus (NCBs) located in each member country, and as it happens, almost every country in the world is a member. One of Interpol's primary forms of communication is the Notices system, whereby NCBs send out formal requests for cooperation and help from other NCBs. Notices are color-coded and cover a wide array of policing matters, the most notable of which is arrest and extradition. While a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant, and individual countries have to decide how to view a Red Notice, many countries do make provisional arrests based on Red Notices (Karlsson, Satter). At their core, Red Notices call for the provisional arrest and likely extradition of individuals to the country that requested the Red Notice, leading some commentators to refer to them as international wanted posters.

Red Notice Abuse: According to British lawyer Anand Doobay who, as described in a 2011 CNN interview, has defended subjects of Red Notices, "There's no transparency to it [Interpol's issuance of Red Notices]. It's weighted in favor of law enforcement and the need to prevent and

disrupt serious crime and terrorism. There's very little by way of protection to keep the state — or even one corrupt prosecutor — from misusing the process." Human rights groups often note the abuse of Interpol to persecute or at least severely harass asylum-seekers and political opponents abroad, suggesting that Interpol has made a value tradeoff that favors the apprehension of potential criminals to the prevention of unjustified persecution of political opponents using the tools meant to spread justice.

Red Notices see use in the harassment of political opponents and activists, a scenario that has occurred

multiple times with Russia. Human rights activist Nikolai Koblyakov was arrested in Bulgaria due to a Red Notice that Russia had called for, though the extradition request was ultimately denied due to insufficient evidence. A more well-known battle with the Russian legal system involves American businessman Bill Browder, who after a long conflict with Russian authorities and activities in the United States promoting the Magnitsky Act, had several Red Notices requested against him, although they were denied, likely due to the clearly and already-publicized political aspects of that situation. Eerik Kross, an Estonian security expert who has held several government posts and advised former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in the midst of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, was also the subject of a Red Notice stemming from Russia. The accusation concerned the hijacking of a ship in the Arctic in 2009, but Interpol ultimately took down the Red Notice, noting the clear political nature of the situation, seeing as Kross has been quite critical of Russian foreign actions.

Russia, however, is not the only country that abuses Interpol's Red Notices. Venezuelan journalist Patricia Poleo was detained in Peru in 2010 based on a Red Notice coming from her home country, despite the fact that the United States had given Poleo political asylum. On the other side of the world, Cambodia was the source of a Red Notice for Daniel Laine, a French investigative journalist who had been digging into the human trafficking and sex trade issues in Cambodia.

At least with these high profile cases involving public figures or people who have already caught the attention of the global media, the actual consequences of these

Red Notices were not completely life-altering. They can, however, severely hinder victims' freedom of movement, employment and overall career prospects, as well as result in short-term arrest in foreign countries. While the abuse of Interpol is worrisome, it is no crisis for the vast majority of people, though surely a crisis for those subjected to groundless and politically-motivated accusations.

The situation presented up to here might suggest that Interpol should focus wholeheartedly on preventing false or misrepresented accusations from functioning through their cooperation net-

work. However, there is a tradeoff to be had with Red Notice issuance. After all, the current state of affairs gives the real criminals less time to run and hide. Furthermore, people who likely have committed crimes can also hide behind the shield of political opponent status. Former Ukrainian President Yanukovych was taken off of Interpol's wanted list in July 2015 after he argued to the organization that his placement on the list was politically motivated, which it might have been. Many who believe Yanukovych to be a real criminal guilty of corruption and abuse of power while he was in office are understandably disappointed in this result, not that Russia would have given Yanukovych up to Ukrainian officials. This is indicative of a general problem international organizations face: individual countries, and especially larger powers like Russia or the United States, will act unilaterally to bypass the organization because they do not trust the organization or simply prefer their own path. Ultimately, Interpol does rely on its member police forces to actually act, meaning police forces controlled by politically-minded government (rather than those who focus on rule of law) can be problem areas.

Potential for Reform: Potential reform measures for Interpol have been suggested by human rights and rule of law focused NGOs like Fair Trials International (headquartered in London) and the Open Dialog Foundation (based in Poland, focused on the post-Soviet space), as well as several DC-based think tanks and scholars. Three common threads are often seen in these reform recommendations: punish Red Notice abusers, increase the transparency of Interpol's internal processes, and develop greater accountability. The first and most relentless suggestion is to

Interpol Headquarters in Lyon, France.



penalize or ban countries that abuse Red Notices or that lack a sufficient level of rule of law in their own territory. This suggestion questions the professionalization of police forces in various countries and their insulation from politics, rightfully so. However, the downsides to such a reform would be significant. Countries kicked out of Interpol's network would be less than pleased, for starters. And for Interpol itself, having countries outside of its cooperation network essentially provides the real criminals with more holes in the world where they can hide with less risk. This problem would look not unlike that created failed

states and ungoverned spaces in regards to transnational terrorism, and ultimately would create too large of a problem to justify implementation at a stringent level.

The second and third ideas are more mutually compatible and follow along what most people would think

Three common threads are often seen in these reform recommendations: punish Red Notice abusers, increase the transparency of Interpol's internal processes, and develop greater accountability.

of when they hear the word "reform" - increased accountability and greater transparency. In the wake of Wikileaks, Edward Snowden, and the Panama Papers, it seems that a large part of the present information age is a demand for increased transparency by the global populace - preferably by powerful institutions' own choice, but if not, then by the actions of a skilled few who will uncover the truth. Given the opacity of Interpol's inner workings noted by the likes of the Heritage Foundation in a 2013 backgrounder,11 it would seem appropriate to publish more information on matters like the issuance of Red Notices. With a quickly increasing number of Red Notices issued in recent years, the need to disseminate this information becomes even more pronounced. Meanwhile, suggestions of increased accountability often sound vague, in part because of Interpol's opacity, but for Interpol, the cost of mistakes is low, which does not properly incentivize caution and prudence. These sorts of reasonable reforms regarding accountability and transparency have been suggested to Interpol by Fair Trials International and others in recent years, and fortuitous-



Eerik Kross, pictured, was the subject of an Interpol Red Notice that originated in Russia from distinctly political motives.

ly, Interpol has received the recommendations well and has already begun adopting changes in the last five years.

A fourth effort might be difficult to implement, but worthwhile if it is deemed achievable. Since Interpol relies on the actual police forces of individual countries to

make provisional arrests and the like, making sure that those police forces understand the potential dubious nature of some Red Notices could help solve this problem. Rather than only look at top-down reform of Inter-

pol, which might be necessary and could occur in any case, countries should look at more "grassroots" effort to prevent police forces from overreacting or too readily accepting the veracity of Red Notices. The obvious issue here is that it places the burden on individual countries and their police forces, but on the upside, it could lead to general policing reform within those countries – and as has been seen in the United States recently, general policing reform is required just about everywhere.

Though international organizations like Interpol provide net benefits to today's international system, individual states can and do continue to push their own national agendas in ways that would have been impossible without the existence of that international organization. Thus, while international organizations provide new avenues for progress across the globe, they also provide new avenues for exploitation and persecution. Both and non-state actors must remain vigilant and continually reform these organizations while remembering the ever-present tradeoffs involved.

The International Response to the Burundi Crisis

An urgent need for increased coordination

Theme: International Organizations

Hayley Elszasz

pril 7 of this year marked the 22nd anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide. Meanwhile, violence and instability are still raging next door. In Burundi, civil strife and violence have been building ever since President Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD party announced that he would run for an unconstitutional third term in April 2015. In July of that year, he was re-elected in an election not recognized as credible by the United Nations (UN) or by the African Union (AU). Since this election, about 500 people have been killed and 280,000 to 350,000 have fled as refugees to neighboring countries such as Rwanda. Responses to the violence from institutions like the UN, AU, and East African Community (EAC) remain stymied, however, as Burundi has refused foreign intervention. These international institutions face a choice between allowing the violence to continue and intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state. The US should support peacekeeping forces deployed by the AU and UN, as intervention external actors is likely necessary for the mediation process to go forward.

The unrest in Burundi is unfolding in a region whose independent history has been punctuated by episodes of

devastating ethnic violence. Burundi has a majority Hutu and minority Tutsi population. Like its neighbor Rwanda, which has a similar ethnic makeup, Burundi has experienced its share of conflict. After the 12 yearlong civil war ended in 2005, Burundi reformed its constitution to create a power-sharing government under the Arusha Accords in order to mitigate the possibility of future ethnic violence. The violence that followed President Nkurunziza's third term bid has brought up fears regionally and internationally that Burundi is on the cusp of descending into another conflagration. According to Dr.

Joseph Siegle, the Director of Research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "The foundation for genocide - the mindset, climate of fear, and polarization - has been laid."

Although many international actors agree that steps need to be taken to stop the conflict, the debate surrounding who should intervene and how is ongoing. The German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeir, during his visit to the region in November 2015, called for the EAC to coordinate the response to the Burundi crisis, promoting a regional solution to the conflict. The UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, has called for the international community as a whole to do more. Dieng points to instances of political figures in the Burundian government inciting violence using ethnically-charged language as evidence for the need to support international intervention. Coordination is needed among international bodies in order to prevent the escalation of the Burundi crisis to civil war or genocide. Among external actors, there appears to be no consensus on who should intervene and how.

The AU is an international institution with the power and mandate to intervene in the Burundi crisis. Although

President Nkurunziza of Burundi.



the AU charter allows for intervention in a member state in circumstances of "war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity," which applies to the Burundi case, this kind of action is unprecedented in the history of the AU. Following an amplification of violence in December 2015, the AU readied a task force of 5,000 troops called the Africa Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) but would not deploy them without permission from the Burundian government. The CNDD-FDD government refused AU intervention, calling it an "invasion." The AU has not acted for fear of setting a precedent of invasion against the consent of the host government.

When the President of South Africa visited Burundi in February, after MAPROBU was rejected, he pledged that the AU would send 100 human rights monitors and 100 military monitors to Burundi. This contribution is much less significant than the suggested 5,000-strong force rejected earlier, but responses to even this minimal force within Burundi have been mixed. The opposition in Burundi says that 200 is not enough, but the government rejects more force as an invasion.


The dilemma here is a challenging one. Although action is being delayed due to fear of creating a precedent

International bodies like the UN and AU face the

dilemma of how to respond, as they must confront a

choice between respecting sovereignty and intervening

in a deadly conflict in an unstable regional setting.



President Nkurunziza of Burundi attends a briefing with the President of Somalia.

rican countries prepare for their upcoming elections, respect for democratic institutions and constitutions hang in the balance. President Kagame of Rwanda has already changed the constitution of his country in order to run for a third term in 2017. The re-election of Nkurunziza and the subsequent violence in Burundi have real regional and continental implications that must be recognized by the international community. International bodies like the UN and AU face the dilemma of how to respond, as they

this crisis in order to end

the violence before it spreads further and before all gains from the Arusha Accords following the civil war are lost.

Both the UN and the AU have the legitimacy to intervene,

"The international community must shift its approach from a focus on crisis response to a culture of early action and prevention. This can only be achieved if regional and international actors jointly focus their energy, attention, and resources and work together without delay to support a nationally-owned inclusive political process in Burundi."

Clearly, the time has already passed for preventative

must confront a choice

between respecting sovereignty and intervening in a deadly conflict in an unstable regional setting. These bodies should set a precedent of coordinated response to

and there is room for both to be involved in the international response to the Burundi crisis. A successful AU-led peacekeeping mission to Burundi could augment the AU's capacity and credibility in the region. Secretary-General Ban Kimoon commented on the need for UN action in his March 2016 briefing on the developments in Burundi. He said:

action in Burundi, but more should be done to stem the spread of violence. As Ban Ki-moon asserted, the process must be as inclusive as possible to government and civil society actors in Burundi. Yet, as CNDD-FDD officials continue to spur international efforts to intervene, it is possible that action must be taken without the approval of Burundi's leading coalition. President Nkurunziza has displayed through his acts of repression and indifference to democratic institutions a disregard for the long-term well-being of his country. Institutions like the UN and AU must act using peacekeeping forces and diplomatic pressure to increase security in the region and prevent escalation to the level of civil war or genocide. The US has a strong interest in promoting democracy and maintaining stability in the region. It should therefore support an AU or UN-led peacekeeping mission to Burundi.

The Role of the United Nations in the **Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

The Possibility of a Multilateral Approach

Theme: International Organizations

Brittany Chung

🧻 stablished in 1945 after the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) is one of the most wellknown international organizations in the world today. Intended to be a new and improved version of the League of Nations, the United Nations was founded to establish peace and preserve security in the international order. In fact, since its inception, the United Nations has been a popular venue in which numerous peacemaking and peacekeeping operations have been negotiated and established.

Despite its active role in many ongoing peacekeeping operations, the United Nations remains largely absent from negotiations involving one of the largest threats to world peace today: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Oddly enough, the United Nations played a very important role in the international diplomacy that led to the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the creation of the state of Israel the following year. In fact, the organization's first peacekeeping mission was to maintain a ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. After that, in 1967, the United Nations Security Council approved two resolutions, UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The resolutions called for territorial compromise, an end to violence, and mutual recognition of state sovereignty.

However, since 1967, the United Nations Security Council has not taken any significant initiative towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, the most powerful member countries of the Security Council, Britain, France, and the United States in particular, have dictated the peace process as separate, independent actors

instead. For example, during both the Oslo Process in 1994 and the Camp David Summit in 2000, the United Nations was excluded from any form of political decision-making.

The United States, the most active member in such diplomatic initiatives, has repeatedly used its power to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict off the Council's agenda. The United States has been unrelenting in its efforts to oversee peace talks between Israel and Palestine due to its vital interests in the region. Hoping that a conclusion to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end its troubled relationships with other countries in that region, the United States has been fighting for monopoly over the peace talks.

Unfortunately, U.S. brokered talks between Israeli and Palestinian authorities have not been successful. In addition to the failure of the Oslo Accords, diplomatic talks led by John Kerry broke down in 2014, with both sides blaming one another for not making enough concessions. After failed attempts towards peace, the situation deteriorated further with an increase in physical violence between the Israeli military and Hamas.

With continuing violence in the Israel-Palestine region, many are now looking to the United Nations as the sole hope for securing peace in the region. Optimism towards an UN-centered solution has been represented in new draft resolutions, one spearhead by the Palestinian Authority, another by the French government.

In contrast, the United States and Israel have openly disapproved a possible UN led intitative. Both countries only advocate for direct talks mediated by the United

tries in the Great Lakes Region. From a US standpoint, it would be a negative outcome for democracy in the region if the gains Burundi made towards inter-ethnic governance and cooperation were lost in this conflict. The stakes are high as the significance of the events in Burundi extends into the rest of the Great Lakes Region. Burundi's neighbor has already shown signs of involvement in the conflict. There are reports of Hutu rebels from Rwan-

for intervening in the affairs of a sovereign nation, inac-

tion could allow violence to build and potentially spreads

past the borders of Burundi into Rwanda and other coun-

Aside from the violence itself, the events in Burundi have negative political implications for the continent. President Nkurunziza has set a negative standard for the region with his unconstitutional third term and his repression of opposition forces. As several other East Af-

da coming to Burundi to support CNDD-FDD militias.

States. In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been quoted saying, "A Security Council resolution to pressure Israel would further harden Palestinian positions, and thereby it could actually kill the chances of peace for many, many years...And that is why I hope the United States will maintain its longstanding position to reject such a U.N. resolution." In addition to Netanyahu, Hilary Clinton, former Secretary of State and current Democratic presidential candidate for the United States, has expressed her disproval for an UN-led initiative. In an interview in April 2016, Clinton stated that the "United Nations is not the venue" to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to its "terrible track record in addressing these issues."

Despite Israel and the United States' obvious preference for the United States as the sole mediator, the United Nations represents the best chance for peace in the region. The chances of the United States continuing its past role as a peace broker seems very low, due to Palestin-

ians' disapproval of the United States' friendly relations with Israel. The United Nations, as a multinational organization composed of both Israel's allies, such as the United States, and Palestine's allies, the Arab States, is capable of providing the neutrality the

peace process demands. Also, unlike the United States, the United Nations prioritizes peace over private regional economic and political aspirations. Therefore, the United Nations is the ideal neutral mediator for the conflict.

In addition, the United Nations might be the only international actor that has both the unity and power to negotiate peace in the volatile region. In terms of unity, the United Nation's main focus on peace would allow the organization to create a coherent, unified plan. In comparison, other multinational organizations, like the European Union, do not possess a coherent vision for the region. Actors who lack a unified plan would fail to be effective peace-brokers for

The passing of UN Resolution 67/19, which upgraded Palestine to non-member observer state status.





Shortly after President Bush left th Middle East Peace Summit, violence in the region resumed.

the conflict. Also, the breadth of the organization's members and the depth of the organization's resources would ensure a well-organized, well-supported plan of action.

In respect to power, the United Nations has the political capital to grant Israel and Palestine's aspirations for

Despite Israel and the United States' obvious preference for the United States as the sole mediator, the United Nations represents the best chance for peace in the region.

legitimacy, recognition and normalization. Therefore, the United Nations has the power and leverage to negotiate for peace. The United Nations, as a coalition including some of the world's most powerful countries, is influential enough to grant the security that Israel desires and the legitimacy that Palestine longs for. As an actor capable of solving some of the most important issues for both parties involved, the United Nations would be able to successfully influence both parties into a peace agreement.

Lastly, the United Nation has a long history of successful mediation efforts in the international stage. The success of the United Nation in other regions demonstrates its ability to be an effective peace-broker. Perhaps more importantly, the United Nations has knowledge of and experience in the region. Its past involvement in the conflict will allow the organization to be a productive, well-informed negotiator.

This is not to say that the United Nations will be a perfect peace-broker. The organization does have many flaws. Yet, its wide political reach and influential economic power allows it to be an integral player in any peacemaking process. In light of failed alternative efforts toward peace, the United Nations might be the best candidate for mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today.

Taiwan's Pursuit of International Space

Without official state status, Taiwan is struggling to attain roles on the world stage.


Theme: International Organizations

Emma Robinson

fficially Taiwan is a part of "One China." What this means, however, is not entirely certain. This term was used in the 1992 consensus between Taiwanese and Chinese officials, which left the definition of "China" intentionally unclear. The People's Republic of China (PRC) believes this means that Taiwan is a formal part of their territory. Taiwan interprets this in different ways, since Taiwan is a democracy and has numerous political parties, but it ultimately allows Taiwan to act independently while leaving the issue of sovereignty unresolved. Although an imperfect solution, this truce has allowed Taiwan and China to foster economic and social ties. Lack of official state status makes it difficult to join international organizations to access information and for Taiwanese to provide their expertise on issues such as health and global climate change.

Statehood is often an implied requirement for membership to international organizations, which makes it difficult for Taiwan. The definition of a state remains debated, but Taiwan meets most of the criteria that are generally agreed upon by political theorists. For example: a clear territory, definite population within the territory,

Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with Taiwanese leadership, President Ma Ying-jeou, for the first time since the split.



and a legitimate government that does not answer to another power (Taiwan makes its decisions independently of China). This definition was used in the Montevideo Convention treaty signed by the Pan-American states in 1933.

The reason that Taiwan has difficulty participating in international relations is because it cannot participate in formal diplomatic relations. Although 22 countries already recognize Taiwan, these countries have relatively small populations and economies, so therefore carry little weight in world politics. Many other countries have a "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office" to address the lack of proper embassies. By trying to participate in international institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Taiwan is engaging in relations with other states, therefore bolstering its legitimacy.

China does not support the use of the name "Taiwan" when Taiwan is participating in international organizations because its name implies it is an independent state. "Taiwan" as a name conflicts with the agreements set forth under the 1992 Consensus. Most countries are unwilling to engage in relations with Taiwan, and most institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and World

Health Organization (WHO), do not allow Taiwan to participate under that name because this would sacrifice their relations with China. China has a great deal of influence and economic power. This influence on other states is why Taiwan lost their UN seat in the first place in 1971.

China does agree to allow Taiwan to play a larger role on the world stage as long as that role does not create a situation of "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas." This means that Taiwan can join institutions under names such as: "Chinese Taipei" or "Taiwan, China." China refers to Taiwan as one



Banners saying "Taiwan's first female president" are flown in support of Taiwan's president-elect.

of its provinces, no different than Sichuan or Yunnan. Although any increase in representation in international politics increases Taiwanese legitimacy, China is willing to make some concessions because they want to retain the favor of the Taiwanese people. Leadership on both sides desire eventual reunification, though with differ-

An increase in involvement on the global stage is essential to Taiwan's wellbeing.

ent stipulations. Since the Taiwanese see participation in international organizations as vital, the Chinese do not want to get in the way else they lose the favor of the Taiwanese people. The Chinese must allow for these concessions if they want peaceful reunification in the future.

Under a variety of different names Taiwan has secured membership in 27 intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and associate membership or observer status in 21 different IGOs. The most important IGOs that "Chinese Taipei" is a part of include: the Asian De-

velopment Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), World Health Assembly (WHA), and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

An increase in involvement on the global stage is essential to Taiwan's wellbeing. By participating in more trade organizations, Taiwan can help its economy function more efficiently: so far, Taiwan's limited access to these institutions has caused it to be economically reliant on China. Limited access to organizations also prevents Taiwanese from contributing their expertise and participating in discussions that affect them. For example: while

Taiwan contributes at most 1% of the world's total carbon dioxide emissions, it cannot participate in the UNFCCC, an important linkage institution.

Another example is natural disaster relief and disease prevention. Although Taiwan has now gained limited access to WHA, its prior inability to join WHO has led to the death of many Taiwanese citizens. After an earthquake in 1999, relief organizations were unable to provide direct assistance and had to provide aid in indirect ways that cost precious time and lives. Another case is the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), during which WHO was unable to give vital assistance to Taiwanese medical researchers.

The U.S. has historically supported Taiwan's engagement in international space under the "One China" policy. The U.S. retains informal relations with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. No American presence officially remains on Taiwan territory, but the

U.S. continues to sell arms to Taiwan.
U.S. government personnel have repeatedly stated that they support the involvement of Taiwan in any international organization that does not explicitly require statehood to enter and therefore

has pushed for organizations to consider more nonstate members. This means that the US has continually refuted Taiwan's inclusion in the United Nations.

Taiwan is continuing to push for more involvement on the world stage. A new president, Tsai Ing-wen, will take office in May. She is a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, which leans more towards sovereignty than her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, a member of the Kuomintang. The world will see if, under Tsai, Taiwan will push more vehemently for an increased presence in world affairs.

Taipei 101: Taiwan's tallest building.



Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Why America should join AIIB

Theme: International Organizations

David Han

Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, many issues in the region are coming into the spotlight. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is one such example. AIIB is a Chinese-led international development bank launched in October 2014 to serve the infrastructural needs of the Asia-Pacific region. China's official stance is that the region has a massive deficit of infrastructural investment for continued economic growth and that this institution will rectify that problem. So far, the US has not joined AIIB, and has instead offered ambivalent verbal support. Rather than sit on the sidelines, the US should join AIIB and capitalize on its expertise in investment banking to influ-

ence one of the largest development banks in existence.

The main reason China established AIIB is that it does not have much clout in the existing Bretton Woods system, in which the US and Europe have veto powers. By establishing AIIB, China is actualizing its goal of becoming a forward player in international development and to expand its influence in the region. This makes China a revisionist state, or a country that is trying to rise in power from the status quo. China's revisionist actions threaten American economic and political influence in the Asia-Pacific because China seeks to become a hegemon. As a result, the US has been adamant about eschewing AIIB. President Obama publically expressed that he is in favor of AIIB if it "lead[s] to good infrastructure and benefit[s]

World leaders gather at Beijing, China for the AIIB Signing Ceremony.



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the borrowing countries."1 Yet, the White House asked its allies not to join AIIB and ultimately suffered diplomatic defeat when many of them, including the UK, Germany, and South Korea, joined. Instead of giving public verbal rebukes, the US should follow suit and join alongside its allies.

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a completely different mission from AIIB. It lends to economically struggling countries money that has been pooled from member nations. With a different goals and different niches, the Bretton Woods institutions and AIIB should

The US should join AIIB and capitalize on its expertise in investment banking to influence one of the largest development banks in existence.

One of the main arguments against joining AIIB is that the US would not have enough voting power to make an impact even if it were to join. It's a fair point: China currently has 26.06% of vote, and in far second is India with a meager 7.51%. However, the US can turn its recent diplomatic defeat into a victory. With many members being America's allies, the US can form a bloc within AIIB. India, Germany, South Korea, Australia, France, and UK collectively have 24.72% to China's 26.06%. If the US were to join, it would add its own voting powers to the mix, allowing it to wield significant influence. One potential fear is that China would use its veto power regardless of the vote. However, the Jin Liqun, the President of AIIB, expressed at the World Economic Forum at Davos that China "has no intention of exercising its veto power."2 In fact, he also stated that China's de facto voting power would decrease as the 57 member organization grew in membership.3 While this serves to build China's ethos internationally, it also provides the US the opportunity to become an influential member within the bank.

Some argue that AIIB will undermine the Bretton Woods institutions. However, Jim Yong Kim, the President of World Bank, has welcomed AIIB onto the international stage and hopes that it can collaborate innovatively to ultimately benefit the most vulnerable. The World Bank's main goal is to reduce poverty, a noble goal and one that is different from that of AIIB. Of course, building and maintaining infrastructure ultimately lead to poverty reduction, but with AIIB largely being regional and specific to infrastructure, it will have a different niche than the World Bank. In addition,

work together, rather than compete with each other.

Unlike the World Bank and the IMF, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is another regional bank with similar goals to AIIB. In ADB, the US has 12.752% voting power relative to China's 5.477%. If the US does not join AIIB, there will undoubtedly be tension and competition between AIIB and ADB when they should cooperate to address their mutual concerns in the Asia-Pacific. If international financial institutions are indeed ways for countries to project influence, then the US can limit China's expansion of power while facilitating the cooperation between AIIB and ADB by joining AIIB.

China created AIIB due to its discontent with the US dominated economic institutions. The US essentially brought this dilemma upon itself by not doing enough to address the issue of voting inequity in said institutions. Though the AIIB has already been created, the US can still become a part of the new institution and continue to influence the international economy. China has already opened the doors for US membership and all there is left to do is join.

Jin Liqun, the first President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.



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First, we'd like to thank you for picking up this first issue of *KJFA* and sincerely hope you enjoyed reading it cover to cover! Or even just a few pages in-between. If you would like to become involved with the journal, have questions about other aspects of the Stanley Kaplan Program, or simply want to talk about foreign affairs, send an email to **kaplanfpj@gmail.com** or talk to any of our staff! This is only the beginning, and we look forward to providing you with even more content in the coming years.

Submission guidelines:

- 800 1,500 words, although longer lengths are also welcome
- Submit pieces in a Microsoft Word file, double-spaced in 12 pt Times New Roman font, 1-inch margins, and footnotes instead of endnotes
- Citations can be in MLA, APA, or Chicago Manual of Style

While papers written specifically for the journal are highly encouraged, papers written for academic courses may also be considered. Writers should be prepared to work with our editors on one or more revisions of their article upon acceptance.

Submissions will be accepted over the summer and into the fall! Contact us if you are not sure about your piece, or if you want to be kept up-to-date about fall deadlines. If your piece is accepted, there will be a follow up to schedule editing sessions in Fall 2016. Please send all submissions and inquiries to **kaplanfpj@gmail.com.**

